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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




DONNE. CASSITY, Trustee, et al., 
) 
Defendants-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 15515 
HAROLD S. SANDERS and ELEANOR SANDERS 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties will be referred to herein either by name 
or in their respective capacities before the Court--Harold s. 
Sanders and Eleanor Sanders, Respondents-Plaintiffs, Donn E. 
Cassity, Trustee, Appellant-Defendant. 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendants, Donn E. 
Cassity, Trustee, and others seeking a declaration by the Court 
that the conveyance of a homestead interest in property trans-
ferred title thereto to Plaintiffs-Sanders free and clear of a 
judgment lien and that title thereto should be quieted in favor 
of the transferees of the judgment debtor. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge James S. Sawaya granted Plaintiffs, Harold S. 
Sanders and Eleanor Sanders a Judgment on the Pleadings upon 
their first cause of action, reasoning that the Plaintiffs, 
as the grantees of Leoda A. Dunham, had acquired her homestead 
interest in the real property that is the subject matter of 
this action, subject to a life estate in favor of Leoda S. 
Dunham, and free and clear of the judgment of Donn E. Cassity, 
Trustee. The Court further reasoned that since the interest 
conveyed by Dunham to Sanders involved her homestead, the in-
terest acquired by the Sanders was free and clear of any claim 
or interest in Donn E. Cassity, Trustee, as provided by Section 
28-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the ruling of the lower 
Court determining that the conveyance to the Plaintiffs-Sanders, 
being the homestead interest of Leoda S. Dunham, resulted in a 
transfer of the property free and clear of the judgment lien 
of Donn E. Cassity, Trustee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Reference to Plaintiff's Amended Conplaint, Defendant's 
Counter-Claim and Cross Complaint and Plaintiff's Reply to Counte 
Claim and other portions of the record are hereinafter ref erred 
to as "T" followed by the page number in the transcript wherein 
the pertinent portion appears . 
. 2. 
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On or about the 17th day of May, 1971, Appellant-Defendant-
Cassity, obtained a judgment against Leoda S. Dunham in the 
principal sum of $11,549.43, together with costs of suit. 
(T-10-13, and 19-25) 
On or about the 1st day of August, 1972, Appellant-
Defendant-Cassity caused to be issued out of the office of the 
Clerk of Summit County, an execution, whereby and wherein the 
sheriff of Summit County was directed to levy and execute upon 
the property of Defendant Leoda Dunham. Thereafter, the sheriff 
of Summit County caused to be posted a Notice of Sale, whereby 
and wherein the property that is the subject matter of this 
action was noticed for sale on the 13th day of Septelllber, 1972 
at the hour of 1:00 p.m. (T-11,12, 19 and 20) The sheriff's 
sale did not occur. 
On or about the 10th day of September, 1972, Leoda s. 
Dunham filed a Declaration of Homestead asserting a claim and 
execption in the amount of $4,600.00 for herself and her brother. 
Said declaration further contained her statement that the value 
of the real estate subject to the homestead declaration, which 
is the subject property in this matter, was $3,600.00. Said 
declaration was recorded on the 11th day of September, 1972, 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder. (T-12,20 and 32) 
Nothing was filed by Appellant-Defendant-Cassity or 
the sheriff of Summit County to indicate that the value placed 
upon the property by its owner, Leoda S. Dunham, was incorrect, 
. 3. 
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understated or excessive. 
On or about the 29th day of November, 1972, Leoda s. 
Dunham, as granter, conveyed by Quit-Claim Deed to Respondents-
Plaintiffs-Sanders, the subject property, reserving in herself 
a life estate. Said deed of conveyance was thereafter recorded 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder. (T-60) 
Respondents assumed the then existing outstanding 
mortgage on the property in favor of Karnas State Bank in the 
amount of $1,991.20, which amount has been fully discharged by 
the Respondents-Plaintiffs. (T-42-47) 
On or about the 11th day of November, 1976, Appellant-
defendant-Cassity, caused to be issued out of the office of the 
Summit County Clerk, an execution, whereby and wherein the sherif 
of Summit County was commanded to execute and levy ·upon the un-
exempt personal and real property of Loeda S. Dunham in an 
amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment of May 17, 1971. 
(T-3,12,23,32) 
A sheriff's sale was held on December 7, 1976. 
Appellant-Defendant bid the entire amount of his judgment for 
the interest of Leoda s. Dunham in and to the property that is 
the subject of this action. (T-12,24,33) 
On or about the 25th day of April, 1977, Respondents-
Plaintiffs-Sanders, filed suit aqainst Appellant-Defendant and 
others seekinq declaratory relief and a judgment quietinq title 
in the Respondents. (T-1) 
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The Trial Court granted Respondents-Plaintiffs Judg-
ment on the Pleadings on the first cause of action of their 
Amended Complaint. (T-64) 
Appellant-Defendant-Cassity thereafter filed a Motion 
to Reconsider and to Amend Findings of Fact. The Motion was 
denied on October 17, 1977. (T-94) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT-DONN CASSITY'S JUDGMENT AGAINST LEODA 
S. DUNHAM WAS NOT SUPERIOR TO THE HOMESTEAD 
INTEREST OF LEODA S. DUNHAM AND THE CONVEYANCE 
OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY FROM DUNHAM TO RESPONDENTS-
SANDERS TRANSFERRED HER HOMESTEAD INTEREST FREE 
AND CLEAR FROM THE JUDGMENT LIEN OF CASSITY. 
The judgment lien of Defendant-Donn E. Cassity did not 
attach to the homestead interest of Leoda s. Dunham. 
Section 28-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
provides, in part: 
"A Homestead ..• shall be exempt from judgment 
lien and from execution or forced sale, except 
upon the following 0bligations: (1) taxes 
accruing and levied thereon; (2). judgments 
obtained by debts secured by lawful mortgage 
on the premises and on debts created for the 
purchase price thereof; and (3) judgments 
obtained by an appropriate party on debts 
created for failure to provide support or 
maintenance for dependent children." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Under the foregoing statute, the homestead declaration 
filed by Leoda S. Dunham on September 10, 1972, exempted the 
property that is the subject matter of this action from " . 
judgment lien and execution of forced sale . . . " (emphasis suppl!ei'. 
The only way in which the Defendant-Cassity's lien could be 
asserted as against the homestead of Leoda S. Dunham would be 
as one of the three exceptions found in Section 28-1-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. However, the judgment of 
Defendant-Cassity was not the result of taxes accruing and levi~ 
thereon. Nor was the judgment of Defendant-Cassity a judgment 
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obtained for debts secured by a lawful mortgage on the premises 
or a debt created for the purchase price of the property. Finally, 
the judgment of Cassity was not based upon debts created for 
failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent children. 
Since the judgment of Defendant-Cassity was not within the three 
statutory exceptions, the property to which the homestead 
declaration applied was not subject to the judgment lien of 
Defendant-Cassity. 
Defendant-Appellant-Cassity in his brief asserts that a 
judgment docketed before a homestead is declared, created a 
judgment lien which is a valid lien under the provisions of 
U.C.A. 78-23-3, is not affected by a subsequent homestead declara-
tion. He further cites the case of Mc Murdie v. Chugg, 107 P. 
2nd 163 (Utah 19~0) as supporting that position. A review of the 
statute and case cited, clearly demonstrates that Defendant-
Appellant' s reliance is unfounded. In Mc Murdie the judgment ob-
tained in the lower Court was based upon notes representing the 
balance due on the purchase of land and water stock together 
with attorney's fees for bringing the action. 
The judgment arose out of debts created for the purchase 
price of the property in question. In short, the judgment in 
Mc Murdie was within the second exception found in Section 28-1-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In the instant case, the Defendant-
Appellant' sjudgment did not meet any of the three exceptions found 
in the Homestead Act. 
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In Mc Murdie, the specific issue before the Court 
was whether or not the homestead statute was in conflict with 
the Utah Constitution because of the exceptions to the home-
stead exemption contained in the homestead statute enacted by 
the legislature. This Court, in that case, drew the same 
distinction that is applicable to this case and said at page 
165: 
"There is a great difference in protecting one's 
homestead to which he has acquired clear title 
from sale on execution for later incurred 
obligations and in providing that a buyer is 
not entitled to a homestead exemption until 
he has fully paid the purchase price for the 
homestead." 
And, this Court, in the same case, citing Harris v. 
Larsen, 24 Utah 139, stated: 
"We see no reason now for changing our ruling 
that a purchaser may not claim a homestead 
exemption to defeat the vendor's lien. To hold 
that he might do so would enable purchasers 
of land to deceive and defraud innocent sellers 
by relying on homestead rights as a defense 
to the payment of a just debt or obligation for 
the purchase of said land. 107 U. 2d at pages 
165 and 166. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Defendant-Appellant, Donn Cassity was not the seller 
of the property to Leoda Dunham. The judgment of Defendant-
Cassity did not arise out of an obligation created for the 
purchase of the subject property. To the contrary, Defendant-
Cassity's judgment is the result of twenty three years of un-
merciful harassment of Leoda S. Dunham by Defendant-Donn CassitY 1 
trustee and his predecessors, which harassment results from an 
. 8. 
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auto accident wherein a judgment was obtained against the 
husband of Leoda S. Dunham in the cases of Fred B. Garret and 
Bruce R. Sizemore vs. George R. Dunham, and the case of James 
L. Barker, Jr., Trustee vs. George R. Dunham and Leoda s. 
Dunham, Case No. 3085, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 9012, 
filed July 2, 1959 cited at 342 P. 2d 867, (1959) 
Donn E. Cassity, Trustee vs. Leoda S. Dunham, District Court 
of Summit County Case No. 3977. 
This Court further cited the Utah cases of: Evans v. 
Jensen, 51 Utah 1, 168 P. 762 and Brown v. Cleverly, 96 Utah 
120, 85 P. 2d 769 as demonstrating the kinds of exceptions from 
the homestead exemption that are recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court. None of those exceptions are present in the instant 
case. In fact, a reasonable reading of the Mc Murdie case 
relied upon by Appellant, clearly demonstrates that this Court 
agrees with the position of Plaintiff-Respondents that the judg-
ment lien of Donn E. Cassity was of no force and effect as 
against the homestead interest of Leoda s. Dunham because it 
did not fall within the statutory exceptions to the homestead 
exemption found in Section 28-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Appellant-Defendant-Cassity next cites the California 
case of Schuler-Knox Co. v. Smith, 144 P. 2d 47 (Calif. 1944) 
as supporting the assertion that a judgment lien will defeat 
a homestead interest. That case involved a California statute, 
not a Utah statute. That case involved the question of whether 
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I 
or not an inferior court of limited jurisdiction had the juris- f 
diction to render the judgment there in question. Although there! 
was a homestead declaration filed, it did not comply with the 
requirements of the California statute. Therefore, the effect 
of the homestead was never considered by the Court. As the 
California Court stated: 
"Since a valid declaration of homestead was not 
recorded until after the abstract of the judgment 
in the Justice Court had been recorded and that 
the homestead was subsequently abandoned by the 
absolute transfer of title by deed of the spouses, 
we are of the opinion it is unnecessary to deter-
mine the effect of the claim of homestead right 
upon Plaintiff's title or right of possession 
under the execution sale." 144 P. 2d 47 at page 
54. (Emplasis supplied.) 
In the instant case, there is no defect in the homestead 
declaration of Leoda s. Dunham. There was in the Schuler-Knox 
case. 
In the instant case there was no abandonment of the 
homestead of Leoda S. Dunham. In Schuler-Knox there was. 
Not only is the case not in point, it is distinguishable 
on its facts from the case at bar. 
Finally, Defendant-Appellant-Cassity, in his argument, 
completely ignores the effect of Section 28-1-10, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which allows the filing of a declaration of 
homestead to be made " . . before the time stated in the noti~ 
of sale on execution, or on other judicial sale, as the time of 
sale, or premises in which the homestead is claimed " Th US 
it can be seen from reading the foregoing statute that a declarat: 
.10. 
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,I 
I 
can be made before the "time of sale". To accept Defendant-
Cassity's argument would require that the declaration be made 
prior to the time that the judgment becomes a lien. If that 
were the case, to be safe, a person would be required to file 
a declaration of homestead at the time he acquired an interest 
in property. 
If he did not file such a declaration until a judgment 
was rendered against him, under Defendant's reasoning, it would 
mean that he could no longer assert such an exemption. If the 
legislature had intended such a result, they would have required 
a filing "prior to judgment" rather than before the time stated 
in the notice "as the time of sale"~ 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-
rnitted that the position asserted by Defendant-Appellant-
Cassity is not only contrary to the statutes of the State of 
Utah relating to homesteads, but is contrary to the intrepretive 
decisions of this Honorable Court and is not supported by 
the authorities relied upon by said Defendant in his brief. 
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as follows: 
POINT II 
THE CONVEYANCE FROM LEODA DUNHAM TO PLAIN-
TIFFS-RESPONDENTS-SANDERS WITH A RETAINED 
LIFE ESTATE WAS A CONVEYANCE WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF SECTION 28-1-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AND OPERATED TO TRANSFER TITLE TO THE 
SANDERS FREE AND CLEAR OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-
CASSITY' S JUDGMENT LIEN. 
Section 28-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
"When a homestead is conveyed by the owner 
thereof such conveyance shall not subject 
the premises to any lien or encumbrance to 
which it would not be subject in the hands 
of the owner; and the proceeds of the sale 
thereof, to the amount of the exemption 
existing at the time of sale, shall be 
exempt from execution or other process for 
one year after the receipt thereof by the 
person entitled to the exemption." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
As indicated in Plaintiff-Respondents' first argument, the prop-
erty of Leoda Dunham was not subject to the judgment lien of 
Defendant-Cassity because of the effect of Section 28-1-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. Since the conveyance by Dunham to Sanders 
was a conveyance of a protected homestead interest, the effect 
of Section 28-1-1 was to transfer the property to Plaintiffs-
Sanders, free and clear of Defendant-Cassity's judgment lien. 
As indicated in the record, Leoda Dunham had no other interest 
to convey. The totalinterest she had in the property was subject 
to he.r homestead declaration. She owned an undivided one-half 
interest in the subject property with the Defendant-Cassity 
.12. 
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owning the other undivided one-half interest as a result of the 
judgment earlier obtained against her deceased husband, George. 
That undivided one-half interest was valued at $3600.00. Her 
homestead exemption was worth $4600.00. When she conveyed 
to the Plaintiffs-Sanders approximately two months after the 
date of her declaration, she had no interest to convey other 
than her homestead property. 
Defendant-Appellant-Cassity's assertion that the 
conveyance by Dunham to Sanders with a retained life estate 
operated to extend the judgment lien of Cassity to the property 
transferred to the Sanders is contrary to the homestead laws 
~nd contrary to the general principles of property law. As 
stated by this Court in In Re Mower's Estate, 73 P.2d 967 
(Utah 1939) , homestead laws should be liberally construed to 
make their application effective for the dependent and helpless 
. to insure them shelter and support ..•. " The effect 
of Defendant's argument would require that a person who has 
preserved a homestead right must not convey that property right 
or any portion thereof at some later date because such a con-
veyance would change that right from a protected to a non-
protected status. 
Such an argument completely ignores the plain language, 
meaning and purpose of Section 28-1-2 because it would not 
extend the homestead protection to a grantee such as Plaintiffs-
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Sanders. The purpose of the homestead exemption is for the 
protection of those in jeopardy of losing everything to a 
judgment debtor. Its basic intent cannot be to restrict the 
alienability of property, something abhorrent to American Law. 
If Leoda Dunham wished to convey all or a part of what she 
owned, that is her right, and the law cannot be heard to 
gainsay this type of conveyance. Therefore, the fact that 
she conveyed away her entire interest in and to the property, 
reserving therein only a life estate in herself, is not only 
consistent with the general policy converning homestead exemp-
tions, i.e. to preserve something for the judgment debtor, 
but also to protect that something against the judgment creditor 
and to allow the judgment debtor to transfer the same without 
the· disability of the judgment·being attached thereto. To 
hold otherwise would mean that a homestead exemption is value-
less. This is not the intent of the Utah homestead statutes 
and is specifically sanctioned by Section 28-1-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
Appellant-Defendant relies upon the California case 
of Arighi v. Rule & Sons, 107 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1940) as support 
for the proposition that the reservation of a life estate did 
not constitute the conveyance of the homestead property. How-
ever, in his memorandum, found at T-91-93, Defendant-Cassity 
has proposed that the act of conveyance by Dunham to Sanders 
.14. 
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was an act which terminated her homestead. In the Arighi case 
the California Supreme Court was, in that case, construing 
the California statute describing what "abandonment of a 
homestead exemption" meant in California for purposes of 
enabling certain lien holders to reach the homestead property. 
Since Utah has no similar abandonment statute, the case is 
not in point. Further, that case deals with California statutes 
and is distinguishable on that basis alone. More importantly, 
Defendant-Cassity has failed to recognize the basis for the 
Court's decision in Arighi. California's policy is the same 
as Utah's, i.e. to protect the same class of people that the 
Utah statutes are designed to protect. Had the California 
Court in Arighi construed the grant in fee to the children 
of the judgment debtor as being an abandonment of the homestead, 
the judgment creditors could have levied upon the property and 
deprived the occupants of any interest in the property. In 
that case, as in the case at bar, the judgment creditor further 
argued that the conveyance to third persons by the judgment 
debtor was void as against the judgment creditor. However, 
that Court disregarded that contention and concluded that the 
only rights a judgment creditor would have as against the person 
receiving the conveyance of a homestead exemption would be for 
any proceeds in excess of the amount of the exemption . 
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It is therefore submitted that not only is the 
Arighi case distinguishable from the standpoint that it 
specifically dealt with the question of abandonment of a 
homestead under California law, but is also factually dis-
tinguishable. Further, that case is also contrary to the argu-
ment Defendant-Cassity makes in this case in that Arighi speci-
fically points out that the homestead right is not an estate 
in land, but is a constitutional and statutory right. That 
right should be protected by this Court in the case at bar. 
Finally, this Court, in Stucki v. Ellis, 201 P.2d 486 (1949) 
has held that it is not necessary to specifically refer to the 
homestead interest at the time of conveyance. In the instant 
case, Leoda Dunham had no other interest to convey and the 
trial court correctly concluded that the conveyance in question 
was protected by Section 28-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
and should therefore be sustained . 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
VALUE OF THE INTEREST CONVEYED TO PLAINTIFFS-
RESPONDENTS-SANDERS WAS LESS THAN THE VALUE 
OF LEODA DUNHAM'S HOMESTEAD AND WAS BASED 
UPON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
Both parties moved for summary judgment or in the 
alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. Both parties 
therefore asserted that there was no genuine material issue 
of fact in dispute. (T-38 & 49) 
Appellant-Defendant-Cassity now asserts that there 
was a dispute as to the value of the property at the time of 
conveyance. Such an assertion is without merit. The homestead 
declaration filed by Leoda Dunham in September of 1972, only 
two months prior to the conveyance, stated the value of her 
undivided one-half interest to be $3600.00. This declaration 
was before the trial court. There was no contrary evidence 
presented by Defendant-Cassity. The value of Leoda Dunham's 
property interest at the time of the conveyance was not ques-
tioned by either the Defendant-Cassity or the executing officer. 
They apparently agreed with her statement of value. Had they 
not agreed they could have proceeded under Section 28-1-16, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for appraisal in the 
event of dispute over the value of a homestead. They did not 
so proceed. Certainly the Sheriff of Summit County, being 
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the selling officer at such sales, would have great familiarity 
with property values and their selling price. The fact that 
he accepted the statement of Leoda Dunham concerning the value 
of the property further supports her appraisal of the value 
of the property at the time of the conveyance. This Court in 
a series of cases has held that an owner of realty is com-
petent to give an opinion as to its value. In Provo Water 
User's Association v. Carlson, et al., 103 Utah 93 (1943), 
this Court stated: 
"An owner of property is always entitled 
to testify as to its value in condemnation 
proceedings. An owner does not have to 
qualify as an expert, nor be engaged in buying 
or selling rea;l estate." 
Although the foregoing decision has been modified by this Court's 
decision in Utah State Road Commission v. Johnson, 580 P.2d 216 
(1976), the general principle of the Provo Water User's Asso-
ciation is still the law. This position is also supported by 
Rule 56 of the Rules of Evidence adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court effective July 1, 1971. See also State of Utah by and 
through its Road Commission v. Dillree, 478 P.2d 507 (1970). 
As is stated by Appellant-Defendant Cassity in his brief at 
page 19, the only evidence of value before the Court was the 
verified statement of Leoda Dunham. There was no opposing 
assertion of value. The question of value was not in dispute . 
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The verified statement of Dunham was made more than five years 
before the date of decision in the instant case. It was made 
before the instant lawsuit was ever considered. There was 
no reason for her to state anything other than the true value 
of her property. The Sheriff accepted her statement. So 
did the Defendant-Donn E. Cassity. He did nothing for five 
years. He could have insisted on an appraisal back in 1972 
when the property was valued and when Cassity's execution and 
attempted levy was fresher. However, the Defendant-Cassity 
apparently preferred to do nothing, to sit back, to accept the 
value as filed with the Court, and await until sometime in the 
future when the appreciation due to inflation and increased 
property values might raise the value of the property beyond 
the homestead exemption and therefore, subject to execution for 
the excess. It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
had sufficient competent evidence of value before it at the 
time of its decision. The value had been accepted by the 
Defendant-Cassity through his inaction or acquiescence. He 
should therefore be estopped after more than five years of 
doing nothing to assert a contrary position. See Pfister v. 
Cow Gulch, 189 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1952). 
Appellant attempts to manufacture a dispute as to 
value by referring to the agreement of Plaintiffs-Respondents-
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Sanders. (T-42 & 45) In his brief he attempts to guess the 
reasons for the purchase of the property by Plaintiffs-Sanders. 
He completely ignores the effect of a one-half undivided 
interest in the subject property by himself and the reduction 
in value that is represented by the prospects of a partition 
suit to divide the property. He completely ignores the effect 
on value that more than 23 years of protracted litigation may 
have had on the value of the property. He erroneously assumes 
that the Sanders would not have agreed to acquire the interest 
of Leoda Dunham if her interest in the property was worth only 
$3600.00. The Sanders were familiar with the property. They 
had known Leoda Dunham for more than 20 years. They were 
familiar with the many years of unrelenting pursuit by the 
Defendant-Cassity and his predecessors in interest to acquire 
the entire property. They were aware of the fact that Leoda 
Dunham could no longer pay the mortgage on her property 
and was facing the prospects of losing the only thing she had 
left in the world, her home, and going on welfare. They 
therefore agreed to purchase her interest, relieve her of 
those burdens and hoped to secure for her a place to live in 
her old age without endless pursuit by Defendant-Cassity. 
Defendant-Appellant's reliance upon the agreement between 
Dunham and Sanders is therefore totally without merit . 
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Defendant-Appellant-Cassity in Points IV, V and VII 
of his brief makes certain technical arguments that are not 
material to the disposition of this case. Indeed, he cites 
no authority for his assertions. With regard to Appellant-
Cassity's argument at Point V, this Court's attention is directed 
to the record and Point III of Respondents-Sanders brief and the 
argument therein contained. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Respondents-Sanders respectfully submit that 
the decision of the Trial Court was correct in all respects. 
The matter was submitted by both parties on Motions indicating 
no dispute as to any material fact. The Trial Court was.in a 
proper position to grant either Motion. The Trial Court had 
before it competent, undisputed evidence of the value of the 
subject property at the time of the homestead declaration and 
conveyance approximately two months later. The Trial Court 
correctly ruled that the conveyance by Leoda Dunham to Plaintiffs-
Sanders was the conveyance of the homestead interest of Leoda 
Dunham. And, since the undisputed value of the property trans-
ferred was less th~n her homestead at the time of the conveyance, 
the property passed to Plaintiffs-Sanders free and clear of the 
judgment of Defendant-Appellant-Cassity. 




BILL THOMAS PETERS 
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